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I. INTRODUCTION1 
American tort law, through its wrong of negligence, may apply 
lower liability than the reasonable person standard to a defendant 
while French fault-based tort liability will always hold a tortfeasor 
liable for his unreasonable behavior. Indeed, under American law, 
the plaintiff must prove four elements to hold the defendant liable: 
the existence of a duty of care, its breach, damage, and causation 
which is further divided into two parts: cause in fact (as 
determined under the “but for” test requiring that the plaintiff’s 
harm would not have occurred but for the defendant’s conduct) and 
proximate cause (implying foreseeability of the damage).2 Thus, 
                                                                                                             
 1. This article is dealing only with wrongful liability and not strict liability, 
which covers two situations in French law (one’s strict liability for damage 
caused by things or persons in one’s custody) that probably plays a more 
important role than in American tort law. 
 2. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 114, at 269 (West 2001). 




not all unreasonable behavior causing damage to the victim leads 
to liability for the defendant. The tortfeasor must first owe a duty 
to act reasonably toward the victim, so that the breach thereof can 
cause him to be liable in negligence to the plaintiff for the damage 
he brought about. If he is not under such a duty or is bound to a 
lighter duty, he is excused from liability, causing American tort 
law to be relative.3 American scholars mostly justified this solution 
through the protection of the country’s common economic good. 
Certain actors are to be released from the duty to act reasonably or 
bound only to a lighter duty when such release far better promotes 
economic competitiveness and efficiency.4 
To the contrary, France doctrine provides for fault-based tort 
liability as applied under the single liability clause embodied in the 
French Civil Code’s articles 1382 and 1383,5 which governs all of 
one’s intentional and negligent liability. Here, a defendant is liable 
if three elements are met: a fault (also known as “breach”), 
damage, and causation.6 In other words, everyone is bound to a 
general duty of reasonable care and is found liable for the damage 
he caused to a victim as soon as he proved to have behaved 
unreasonably. It need not be shown that the tortfeasor owed the 
victim a specific duty of care in the first place for liability to 
                                                                                                             
 3. Jean Limpens, Robert M. Kruithof & Anne Meinertzhagen-Limpens, 
Liability for One’s Own Act, in [XI/1, Torts] INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW, § 2-147, at 70 (André Tunc ed., Martinus Nijhoff Pubs. 
1983). 
 4. MARSHALL S. SHAPO, PRINCIPLES OF TORT LAW §55.04, at 308 (2d ed., 
Thomson West 2003). 
 5. Civil Code art. 1382 reads: “Any act whatever of man, which causes 
damage to another, obliges the one by whose fault it occurred, to compensate it.” 
And art. 1383 provides that “[e]veryone is liable for the damage he causes not 
only by his intentional act, but also by his negligent conduct or by his 
imprudence.”  
 6. See GENEVIÈVE VINEY & PATRICE JOURDAIN, LES CONDITIONS DE LA 
RESPONSABILITÉ, TRAITÉ DE DROIT CIVIL, § 246, at 1 (3d ed., Jacques Gesthin 
ed., L.G.D.J. 2006); WALTER VAN GERVEN, JEREMY LEVER & PIERRE 
LAROUCHE, COMMON LAW OF EUROPE CASEBOOKS, TORT LAW at 2-3 (Hart 
Publ’g 2000). 




apply.7 Accordingly, French fault-based tort liability is deemed to 
constitute a “general principle of liability for fault.”8 
At first sight, this discrepancy of the scope of wrongful liability 
may be explained by the different ways these two countries deal 
with one’s liability under multiple torts or a single one. On the one 
hand, the United States uses separate torts, inherited from English 
law, to deal with each liability situation. Negligence is just the 
specific tort that handles the liability of those who behave 
carelessly.9 On the other hand, France implements a single liability 
clause that provides for the liability of all of those who 
intentionally or negligently breach the duty of reasonable care.10 
Nevertheless, the American tort of negligence is very close to the 
French single liability clause. Like its French counterpart, it 
actually creates a general duty of care upon individuals who are 
held liable if they negligently (or even intentionally11) breach it 
and cause the victim damage. It is a general, “catch-all” liability 
rule which potentially offers endless protection against all 
wrongful misconducts to such extent that a duty of (reasonable or 
limited) care exists.12 In this sense, it is very similar to the French 
                                                                                                             
 7. VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 6, § 441, at 364-66; PHILIPPE 
MALAURIE, LAURENT AYNÈS & PHILIPPE STOFFEL-MUNCK, LES OBLIGATIONS § 
53, at 30 (5th ed., Defrénois 2011); FRANCOIS TERRÉ, PHILIPPE SIMLER & YVES 
LEQUETTE, LES OBLIGATIONS, DROIT CIVIL § 729, at 701 (8th ed. Dalloz 2002); 
Limpens et al., supra note 3, § 2-5, at 5, §2-23, at 13; VAN GERVEN ET AL., 
supra note 6, at 2-3. 
 8. See, e.g., Geneviève Viney, Pour ou contre un principe général de 
responsabilité civile pour faute?, 49 OSAKA UNIV. L. REV. 33, 34 (2002); 
MALAURIE ET AL., supra note 7, § 52, at 29-30. 
 9. MALAURIE ET AL., supra note 7, § 1, at 2-3; Limpens et al., supra note 3, 
§ 2-16 & 2-17, at 10-11.  
 10. VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 6, § 450, at 380; Limpens et al., supra 
note 3, § 2-5, at 5, §2-23, at 13; VAN GERVEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 2-3. 
 11. However, in practice, when an American lawyer can argue both the 
existence of an intentional tort and negligence in a case, he will often choose the 
intentional tort, because it sometimes has a slightly broader scope and appears 
more outrageous for judges and juries who are inclined to award higher 
damages. 
 12. Limpens et al., supra note 3, § 2-18, at 5; CHRISTIAN VON BAR, 1 THE 
COMMON EUROPEAN LAW OF TORTS § 274, at 297-98 (Clarendon Press 1998); 
KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 623-
24 (3d ed., Tony Weir trans., Clarendon Press 1998). 




single liability clause, and the undertaking of a comparison 
between these two grounds of liability proves very relevant.13 
Therefore, the issue of the determination of the scope of 
tortfeasors’ liability for fault needs to be addressed in both 
countries to assess whether France really abides by general fault-
based tort liability or if it actually implements relative tort liability 
to ensure its economic well-being, like the United States. This 
study claims that France departs from its general principle of 
liability for fault and instead applies relative tort liability like 
American law by diverting the prima facie case of one’s liability 
for fault (especially the force majeure defense, causation and the 
duty itself). Thus, people in France are not always bound to the 
duty of reasonable care. They may be under limited liability with 
no duty of reasonable care at all, or only a lighter one. It is up to 
the plaintiff to prove that the defendant breached a duty and caused 
him damage in order to hold him civilly responsible. Otherwise, 
like in American negligence, he is excused from liability.  
It must be emphasized that this piece will rely on hypotheses of 
both French tort and contract liability for the sake of its analysis. 
This is based on the fact that French contract law has a broader 
scope than American contract law and provides for liability that is 
usually covered in torts in America. Indeed, in American contract 
law, the general rule is that when a party fails to achieve the 
promised results and breaches the contract,14 he is liable for the 
other contracting party’s lost profit (expectations damages).15 If he 
also happens to be negligent while performing his contract, he will 
be held accountable in tort for the property damage and personal 
injury he caused, unless there is an explicit or implied warranty 
                                                                                                             
 13. GENEVIÈVE VINEY & BASIL MARKENIS, LA RÉPARATION DU DOMMAGE 
CORPOREL, ESSAI DE COMPARAISON DES DROITS ANGLAIS ET FRANÇAIS § 12, at 
11 (Economica 1985). 
 14. This paper does not deal with other remedy issues such as the 
termination of the contract for material breach. 
 15. ANTHONY M. SKROCKI & CLAUDE D. ROHWER, CONTRACTS IN A 
NUTSHELL §9-2, at 315 (6th ed., Thomson West 2006). 




granting the victim such recovery in contracts as well.16 On the 
contrary, in France, when two parties freely enter into a contact, 
they are usually liable in contracts for the damage they cause to 
each other in the course of the performance of the contract,17 
especially for the damage that a third party would not otherwise 
suffer.18 Tort liability cannot add up in these cases.19 Accordingly, 
when a party breaches the contract, the breached party is entitled to 
expectation damages exactly like in American law. 20 Then, when 
specifically performing a contract requiring the achievement of 
some work, a party is deemed to be bound to an additional 
covenant to act like a reasonable person, causing him to be liable 
under this covenant to the opposing party for his property damage 
and personal injury if he fails to do so. This covenant similar to a 
warranty of workmanlike performance can be express21 or implied 
(especially in service contracts)22 in the law. Sometimes, French 
case law even adds to the contract a specific warranty to assure the 
other contracting party’s safety during the performance of the 
                                                                                                             
 16. EDWARD J. KIONKA, TORTS IN A NUTSHELL §10-1, at 191 (4th ed., 
Thomson West 2004). 
 17. See GENEVIÈVE VINEY, INTRODUCTION A LA RESPONSABILITÉ, TRAITÉ 
DE DROIT CIVIL § 185, at 327 (2d ed., Jacques Gesthin ed., L.G.D.J. 1995). 
 18. Specifically when based on the warranty to ensure someone’s safety. 
See VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 6, § 501, at 470. 
 19. This is to offer actors the possibility to provide for liability limits 
(unless they commit intentional misconduct, or gross negligence, or they are 
accordingly entitled to a way out of the contract) that are only legal in contracts 
and not in torts. See VINEY, supra note 17, § 220, at 407. 
 20. See VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 6, § 251-2, at 31. 
 21. For instance, Civil Code art. 1880 reads regarding a loan for use: “[t]he 
borrower is bound to take care of the keeping and preservation of the thing 
loaned like a prudent owner.”  
 22. Ex.1: A customer enters into a contract with a mechanic to change his 
car’s brakes under French law. The mechanic fails to install the promised 
brakes. He is liable for the contract breach to the customer, and the customer 
may recover from him the extra costs he had to pay to another mechanic to 
install the right brakes. 
Ex. 2: Same facts as in example 1, except that he installs the proper brakes in a 
defective way, and the customer gets into a car accident causing him to be 
injured and his car to be damaged. The mechanic is deemed here to be bound to 
an implied extra warranty of workmanlike performance. Therefore, the customer 
will recover for his bodily injury and property damage based on the breach 
thereof by the mechanic.  




contract to allow such compensation.23 Moreover, while a party 
breaching the contract by failing to achieve the promised result is 
strictly liable for his breach like in American law,24 the party 
bound to such warranties has usually to use only his best efforts to 
act reasonably while performing the contract and he is only liable 
for failing to do so (i.e., for fault).25 Thus, such liability for breach 
of warranties under French law relates more to tort law like in 
American law. As a result, this paper will integrate it into its 
analysis of the scope of limited French torts. 
This study will start by emphasizing the American relative 
principle of negligence liability (Part II). Then, it will describe the 
traditional general principle of liability for fault in French law (Part 
III). Furthermore, France’s implied limitations on the scope of the 
defendant’s liability for fault will be addressed (Part IV). Lastly, a 
new approach officially establishing the existence of a limited duty 
of care in French fault-based tort law will be suggested (Part V).  
II. AMERICAN RELATIVE PRINCIPLE OF NEGLIGENCE LIABILITY 
Inherited from English law, American negligence proves 
relative through the implementation of the duty element and 
proximate cause that limit the defendant’s duty of reasonable 
care.26 The defendant must breach a duty of care to which he owes 
the plaintiff and be able to foresee the risks created by his conduct 
to be held liable for the damage he caused to the victim. If he is 
under no duty or cannot predict the damaging result, he is not 
guilty of negligence. This paper will first deal with the duty of 
                                                                                                             
 23. VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 6, § 499, at 453; VAN GERVEN ET AL., 
supra note 6, at 281. 
 24. In French law, this party is said to be bound to an obligation de résultat, 
i.e., to achieve a specific result. See VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 6, § 541, at 
526. 
 25. French law qualifies this covenant as an obligation de moyen, i.e., to use 
one’s best effort to perform it. However, it may be upgraded to an obligation de 
résultat to enhance the defendant’s liability. See VINEY & JOURDAIN, supra note 
6, § 541, at 526. 
 26. See discussion, supra Part I. 




reasonable care as applied in negligence (A). Then, it will address 
the limits that the existence of a lower duty and proximate cause 
create on the scope of the defendant’s duty (B). This present study 
will not talk about cause in fact and damage, because they do not 
come into play in defining one’s liability limits.  
A. Breach of the Duty of Reasonable Care 
At first glance, the defendant is held liable when he breaches 
his duty of reasonable care (1). This breach is assessed according 
to several methods (2). 
1. Definition of the Duty of Reasonable Care 
The defendant breaches his duty of reasonable care when he 
behaves negligently (a). This can be varied by certain 
circumstances (b). 
a. Exercise of Reasonable Care 
The default rule is that people owe a general duty of reasonable 
care to their neighbors.27 This means that they have to avoid 
injuring others by negligent conduct. It does not impose a duty to 
avoid all injury to others. The English landmark case Blyth v. 
Birmingham Waterworks Co. is one of the first cases to give the 
definition of reasonable care.28 This case involved a constructor 
who had installed a water main in the street with fireplugs at 
various points. During an extremely cold winter, the frost caused 
the freezing water in the main to break force out the connection 
between some plugs and the water main. Later, when the main 
thawed, the water in it leaked out and flooded the plaintiff’s house. 
The trial court found the constructor guilty of negligence and 
awarded the homeowner damages.  
                                                                                                             
 27. See DOBBS, supra note 2, § 117, at 277.  
 28. Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co., 156 Eng. Rep. 1047 (1856). 




The Court of Exchequer reversed the decision. It held that 
“negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable 
man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate 
the conduct of human affairs would do or doing something which a 
prudent and reasonable man would not do.”29 Here, the extreme 
severity of the frost in the year when the damage occurred proved 
exceptional compared to the usual weather in the area. A 
reasonable man would not have taken precautions against such 
extraordinary frosts. Therefore, the defendant was reasonable in 
not planning for this weather and could not be accountable for 
negligence. 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts section 282 confirms that 
the defendant’s failure to exercise reasonable care causes him to be 
liable for negligence: “Negligence is conduct which falls below the 
standard established by law for the protection of others against 
unreasonable risk of harm. It does not include conduct recklessly 
disregardful.” 
b. Influence of Certain Circumstances 
Even though the standard of reasonable care is an objective 
standard, it depends on specific circumstances. It is said that the 
defendant must exercise the care that a reasonable and prudent 
person under the same circumstances would have exercised to 
avoid risks of harm to others.30 First, external circumstances can 
relax the standard of reasonable care. Thus, in case of an 
emergency, the actor’s behavior is evaluated by comparison to the 
conduct that a reasonable and prudent person would have adopted 
in this dangerous situation. He is not liable if the reasonable and 
prudent person would have acted alike, even though in retrospect 
another course of action would have avoided the damage.31  
                                                                                                             
 29. Id. 
 30. See DOBBS, supra note 2, § 117, at 277. 
 31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 296 (ALI 1965); see DOBBS, 
supra note 2, § 129, at 304. 




Secondly, the law takes into account the personal 
circumstances of the actor. On the one hand, this may lead to 
lighten the standard of reasonable care, especially for those that are 
of a young age32 or physically disabled33 (but not those mentally 
deficient in intelligence, judgment, memory, etc., the insane, and 
the intoxicated34). Thus, a minor35 or a physically disabled 
person36 is required to adhere to the standard of reasonable care of 
a minor of the same age or a disabled person affected by the same 
physical handicap. They are not required to meet the same standard 
of behavior as adults or those with normal physical capacity. That 
would be too high a burden to hold them liable for failing to 
conform to an impossible standard of physical conduct or maturity. 
On the other hand, special knowledge, skills, and experience may 
strengthen the standard of reasonable care. This usually involves 
professionals who perform licensed activities or occupations 
(physicians, attorneys, pilots, motorists, etc.) which cause the 
public to rely on them to supply services of quality. Therefore, the 
actor is held to a specific standard of reasonable care in the sense 
that he has to act like a reasonable and prudent person with such 
expertise, and not only with common knowledge.37 
2. Method for Determining the Breach of the Duty of Care 
The plaintiff has to establish that the defendant breached his 
duty of reasonable care by failing to act like a reasonable and 
prudent person in order to hold him liable for negligence. The 
general method for determining whether the defendant breached 
                                                                                                             
 32. See DOBBS, supra note 2, § 124, at 293. 
 33. Id. § 119, at 282. 
 34. Id. § 120, at 284. 
 35. Unless he engages in an adult’s activities (such as operating a car or 
flying an airplane), in which case he is held to an adult standard of care; see, 
e.g., DOBBS, supra note 2, § 125, at 298. 
 36. Unless a reasonable and prudent disabled person would have behaved 
like a non-disabled person; see, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 2, § 119, at 282. 
 37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 289; see DOBBS, supra note 2, § 
122, at 290. 




such a duty is to apply the risk-utility balancing test, defined by 
Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Caroll Towing Co. (a).38 
Customs and statutes can also impact the establishment of the duty 
of reasonable care (b). 
a. Risk-Utility Balancing Test 
In the Caroll Towing case, the owner of a barge hired a tug to 
move a barge containing a cargo of flooring materials belonging to 
the United States. However, the tug employees negligently moored 
the barge to a pier. As a result, the barge broke away from its 
mooring and hit a tanker’s propeller, which tore a hole in the 
barge, eventually sinking it. The barge owner sought compensation 
from the tug owner for the cost of the cargo, for which he was 
accountable to the United States, and the loss of its barge. Yet the 
tug owner claimed that the barge owner had been contributorily 
negligent in not being continuously on board, and that he had to be 
found partially responsible for the loss of the cargo and the barge. 
Thus, the issue was whether it was reasonable for the barge owner 
not to have a bargee or attendant continuously present on board.  
Judge Learned Hand set out his formula to determine whether 
the barge owner was liable: 
It is a function of three variables: (1) the probability that 
[the barge] will break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting 
injury, if she does; (3) the burden of adequate precautions. 
Possibly it serves to bring this notion into relief to state it in 
algebraic terms: if the probability be called P; the injury L; 
and the burden B; liability depends upon whether B is less 
than L multiplied by P; i.e, whether B is less than PL.39 
Here, the accident occurred during World War II, when war 
activities caused barges to be constantly moved in and out of the 
crowded harbor. Therefore, the likelihood that the job of tying up 
the barge to the pier could not have been done with adequate care 
                                                                                                             
 38. United States v. Caroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). 
 39. Id. at 173. 




was fairly high. Moreover, the injury to the vessel was likely to be 
significant because of the presence of a large number of boats in 
comparison to the size of the harbor. Finally, the burden imposed 
on the barge owner to maintain an attendant on board was low, 
because the accident happened in winter, when the working hours 
of the employees in the harbor were shortened as the result of the 
fewer hours of daylight. Therefore, the burden of continuously 
having an employee on board was less than the probability of 
accident multiplied by the expected loss. In conclusion, the barge 
owner was held contributorily negligent in not having a member of 
his staff constantly present on board and received only partial 
compensation for his damage.40  
b. Impact of Customs and Statutes on the Duty of Reasonable 
Care 
Courts can also use complementary methods for establishing 
the duty of reasonable care. First, they can rely on customs. For 
instance, this covers the situation where the plaintiff argues that the 
defendant was negligent because he did not follow the customary 
practices in his business field. In this case, the custom is said to be 
used as a sword. Conversely, the defendant can assert that he 
followed the customary practice to prove that he did not act 
unreasonably and was careful. Here, he uses the custom as a shield. 
Generally, courts consider that customary practices do not set the 
standard of care, which remains the standard of a reasonable and 
prudent person under the same circumstances. It only gives some 
evidence of what this standard is.41 
Second, judges can refer to the standards of conduct prescribed 
by statutory provisions to determine the duty of reasonable care. 
Not only do these include statutes passed by Congress and the state 
legislatures, but they also encompass municipal ordinances, 
                                                                                                             
 40. This standard has been adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 
291-293. 
 41. See DOBBS, supra note 2, § 163, at 393. 




administrative regulations and even constitutions.42 Then, to be 
admissible as a tort law standard of reasonable care, the statute 
must have been intended to protect a class of persons that includes 
the plaintiff against the particular risk of injury neglected by the 
defendant.43 Finally, the statute may have varied weight when it is 
applied. In a few states, the violation of a statute is negligence per 
se and the defendant is automatically considered negligent.44 In the 
majority of states, the defendant who violates a statute is presumed 
negligent, and he can rebut this presumption of negligence with 
contrary evidence.45 In the other states (forming a considerable 
minority of states), the violation of a statute is merely evidence of 
negligence, meaning that the statute is considered together with 
other evidence to determine whether the defendant was negligent 
according to the Hand Formula.46 
To hold the defendant liable, the plaintiff must also prove that 
the defendant’s negligence in failing to take the reasonable 
precautions to avoid injuring him falls within the scope of the duty 
to which the defendant owes the plaintiff. 
B. Means to Limit the Scope of the Defendant’s Duty of Care 
To constitute actionable negligence, the defendant’s negligent 
conduct must fall within the scope of the duty that he owes to the 
victim. Traditionally, American law limited the scope of the 
defendant’s liability by requiring that he was under such a duty to 
act reasonably and proximate cause was shown (1). Presently,, 
both of these principles are actually considered to relate to the 
same issue of the delimitation of the scope of the defendant’s duty 
of care-based public policies (2). 
 
                                                                                                             
 42. Id. § 133, at 311. 
 43. Id. § 137, at 323-26. 
 44. Id. § 134, at 315; See KIONKA, supra note 16, at 78. 
 45. See DOBBS, supra note 2, § 134, at 315. 
 46. Id. § 134, at 317. 




1. Traditional Limitations by Duty and Proximate Cause 
The defendant’s liability was traditionally limited by the 
application of the duty element (a) and proximate cause (b). 
a. Duty 
Following the English common law of torts, American 
negligence law has always applied restrictions on the general duty 
of reasonable care when its enforcement would lead to unfair 
results.47 Many categories of specific duties may actually 
overcome the general duty of reasonable care.48 On the one hand, 
the defendant may owe no duty at all. He can never be held 
negligently liable, even though his conduct was unreasonably 
risky.49 On the other hand, he may owe only a limited duty and the 
plaintiff will have to prove aggravated negligence.50 For instance, 
the orthodox view is that no one owes a duty to act affirmatively to 
rescue someone else in the absence of some special relationship. 
Thus, a defendant could not be held liable for negligence because 
he watched a person with a visual disability step in front of a car 
and did not call out to him, even if it created no inconvenience or 
danger to do so.51  
The determination of the existence and measure of the 
defendant’s duty is decided by judges based on policy 
considerations, such as the extent to which the transaction was 
intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of the harm to the 
plaintiff, the degree of certainty of injury to him, the closeness of 
the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury 
suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the 
                                                                                                             
 47. Id. § 111, at 262. 
 48. Id. § 225, at 575. 
 49. Id. § 117, at 277. 
 50. Id. § 117, at 277. 
 51. Id. § 227, at 579. 




policy of preventing future harm by deterrence, and the 
administrative problem for courts in enforcing the duty.52 
b. Proximate Cause 
The second mechanism by which the law has cordoned off 
one’s liability is proximate cause. At the outset, it must be 
emphasized that proximate cause is different from cause in fact. 
Here, causation is established as the defendant’s conduct is a 
necessary antecedent of the victim’s damage.53 Proximate cause 
rather looks upon policy considerations and holds that the 
defendant is liable only if, at the time he acted, he could reasonably 
foresee that the specific risk that his negligent conduct created 
would injure the victim.54 It is a jury question that distinguishes it 
from duty.55 
The Wagon Mound case, decided in England, illustrates this 
idea very well.56 In this case, a ship discharged some oil into the 
water of the port of Sydney, near the dock where the plaintiff’s 
employees were doing welding work. This oil fouled the plaintiff’s 
dock. However, due to its high ignition point, the oil was unlikely 
to burn. But, randomly, some cotton waste was floating in the oil 
underneath the dock and caught fire when the worker dropped 
some molten metal on it. This ignited the oil, and the plaintiff’s 
dock burned down. The plaintiff argued that, since the defendant 
could foresee that his oil spill could cause the plaintiff some injury 
by fouling his dock, he should be held liable for the entire damage 
which actually happened, the fire included. Nonetheless, the Privy 
Council held that the plaintiff could only recover for the injuries 
that the defendant should have anticipated at the time it released 
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the oil into the water. Thus, he could recover only for the fouled 
docks, but not for the fire that was unforeseeable. 
Following this case, it was later decided that it is the general 
risk/harm that must be foreseeable and not the special mechanism 
that brought it about.57 In short, it is considered that the defendant 
is actually released from liability because there is an intervening, 
superseding event that makes the occurrence of the damage 
completely unpredictable.58 For instance, there is such an 
unpredictable, superseding cause when “a bizarre, unforeseeable 
event gives rise to a risk different from the one the defendant 
should have anticipated.”59 The same also happens when a third 
party unexpectedly commits an intentional tort, such as a crime.60 
Accordingly, this actually creates a limit to the duty of 
reasonable care. One may not be liable while behaving 
unreasonably by failing to prevent probable damage in general 
from occurring to the victim. To be held accountable, he still has to 
be able to foresee the specific damage caused to the defendant as 
assessed under the reasonable person standard. As a result, he is 
only bound to a limited duty to preclude the specific damage that 
he could reasonably foresee.61 
2. Modern Means to Limit the Scope of the Defendant’s Duty of 
Care Based on Public Policies 
The modern approach limits the defendant’s liability by 
requiring that the scope of his duty of care encompass the 
plaintiff’s damage to hold him liable (a). This delimitation of the 
scope of his duty of care is based on public policies (b). 
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Both duty and proximate cause achieve the same purpose. They 
ask the same policy question: should this particular defendant be 
liable for this precise damage to this specific victim under those 
special circumstances?62 Thus, the defendant may no longer be 
under the general duty of reasonable care. He may owe the victim 
no duty at all, or he may be bound to a lighter duty that requires the 
victim to prove aggravated negligence, such as gross negligence.63 
As a result, they should be combined into the united concept of the 
scope of the defendant’s duty of care.  
The famous Palsgraf case supports this view.64 A passenger 
dropped his package while the railroad company’s employees 
helped him board a train that was leaving the station. The package 
contained fireworks that exploded when the luggage hit the 
ground. Then, a remote scale fell as a result of the blast and hit 
another passenger, Mrs. Palsgaf, who was waiting further down on 
the platform.  
Justice Cardozo, writing for the majority, ruled that the 
establishment of the train company’s duty of care and its ability to 
foresee the risk caused by its conduct are actually related to the 
same liability issue of the determination of the scope of its duty of 
care. The defendant is negligently liable if the scope of his duty 
encompasses the victim’s damage, and this is the case when he is 
able to foresee the risks created for him. Here, the court deemed 
that the risk of explosion caused by a passenger dropping his 
luggage full of explosives while being helped to board the train 
was foreseeable. However, it was not predictable that the blast 
would knock a scale down onto a passenger standing hundreds of 
feet away. Therefore, the railroad did not owe any duty to the 
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victim and was excused from liability. Thus, duty and proximate 
cause constitute the same element requiring the scope of the 
defendant’s duty of care to encompass the victim’s damage to 
establish his liability. Whether the victim’s harm falls within the 
scope of the defendant’s duty is a question of public policy usually 
decided by judges.  
b. Public Policies Driving the Limits on the Scope of the 
Defendant’s Duty 
As seen in Palsgraf case, the first and most common public 
policy which limits the scope of the defendant’s liability is 
foreseeability of the risk. Here, similarly to proximate cause,65 one 
is no longer required to behave reasonably to prevent probable risk 
in general from occurring. He is only bound to a limited duty to 
prevent the specific damage that he could reasonably foresee in 
order to be held liable for it. 66  
Regarding other public policies shaping the scope of the 
defendant’s duty, Louisiana’s Pitre case67 can be cited as an 
example.68 Here, a doctor negligently performed sterilization 
surgery on a woman; she subsequently became pregnant and gave 
birth to a child with albinism. The parents filed several actions to 
get their various damages compensated. First, they brought a 
wrongful pregnancy action. This action included the pain and 
suffering and the expenses incurred during the unwanted 
pregnancy and delivery, along with the economic cost of rearing an 
unplanned child. They also filed a wrongful birth action for the 
special expenses and the pain and suffering resulting from the 
child’s deformity. Finally, they took a wrongful life action on 
behalf of the child for his damage for having to live with a defect.  
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The Louisiana Supreme Court enunciated the different public 
policies that determine the scope of a defendant’s liability for the 
damage caused to a victim. This scope depends on the 
foreseeability of the risk, the moral aspect of the defendant’s 
conduct, the need for compensation, the need for incentive to 
prevent future harm, the relative ability of each class of litigants to 
bear and distribute loss, the historical development of precedent, 
and the efficient administration of the law.69  
In applying these factors, it was decided that the physician’s 
duty did not extend to compensate the child’s defective life under 
the wrongful pregnancy action and he was, accordingly, excused 
from liability for it. Indeed, it would imply that the law values the 
fact of not being born higher than the fact of being born, which the 
High Court found inadmissible.70 Then, the surgeon was relieved 
from the parent’s wrongful birth action for the additional cost and 
pain of raising a disabled child. This handicap was not deemed 
foreseeable as a result of the surgery in reference to the scientific 
knowledge at the time.71 Finally, the court held that the doctor’s 
duty encompassed the wrongful pregnancy action. But, it allowed 
recovery only for the financial and psychological cost of the 
pregnancy and delivery. It denied compensation for the normal 
expenses of rearing a child, because a child is always “a 
blessing”.72  
Unlike American law, French tort law does not seem to limit 
the scope of the defendant’s duty of reasonable care in determining 
his liability.  
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III. TRADITIONAL GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF LIABILITY FOR FAULT IN 
FRENCH LAW  
The French general principle of liability for fault is laid down 
in Civil Code articles 1382 and 1383.73 According to these 
provisions, a defendant is held civilly responsible for his 
intentional or negligent misconduct when three elements are met. 
First, the defendant must have breached the duty of reasonable care 
to which everyone is bound. This element is called “fault” in 
France. Second, the plaintiff has to suffer damages that are of the 
same types as in American law. Third, some causation similar to 
American “cause in fact” needs to be proven.74 There is no 
additional element that would limit the scope of the tortfeasor’s 
liability under certain circumstances. He is liable as soon as he 
behaved unreasonably and caused the victim damage. This section 
will address the general issue of fault which sets the general fault-
based liability rule by dividing it into two aspects: the definition of 
fault as objective unlawful conduct (A), and its assessment based 
on the only standard of reasonable care (B). Damage and causation 
will not be dealt with in this part, since they apparently do not 
come into play in defining the limits on one’s liability. 
A. Definition of Fault as Objective Unlawful Behavior 
The concept of fault has evolved from subjective unlawful 
behavior (1) to objective illicit conduct (2). 
1. Classical Subjective Approach of Fault 
In the past, fault consisted of two elements. The first one 
required a violation of a pre-existing duty by the defendant. In 
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other words, the fault was established when the actual conduct of 
the tortfeasor was inconsistent with the conduct required by legal 
duties. It was an objective element.75 The second component 
demanded that the unlawful conduct be imputable to the actor in 
order to find him liable. This was the case if the actor had the 
psychological capacity of understanding and accepting the 
consequences of his conduct. This element was subjective.76 
2. Modern Objective Conception of Fault 
Today, to establish the defendant’s fault, the plaintiff only has 
to prove that he objectively acted in an unlawful way. There is no 
longer need to demonstrate his conduct was imputable to him, i.e., 
he could understand that his conduct was unlawful. This evolution 
took place in two successive steps.  
First, the legislature passed the Act of January 1968 to make 
mentally deficient adults liable for their negligence. This law, 
which was inserted in the Civil Code at article 489-2, reads: “A 
person who has caused damage to another when he was under the 
influence of a mental disorder is nonetheless liable to 
compensation.” Thus, mentally disabled adults can now be held 
liable for negligence, even though their mental deficiency prevents 
them from realizing that their conduct is unlawful. The subjective 
element of imputability is no longer required for them.77  
Then, the French Supreme Court for civil and criminal matters 
(Cour de cassation), sitting in its highest form, overthrew the 
requirement of imputability for children in four cases decided on 
May 9, 1984.78 For example, in one of them, the Justices held a 13-
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year-old child contributorily negligent in being electrocuted after 
he failed to disengage the circuit-breaker prior to screwing the bulb 
on a light socket defectively assembled by an electrician. The 
Supreme Court especially denied having to assess the child’s 
awareness of the illegality of his conduct to be able to hold him 
contributorily negligent. Thus, this decision shows that the actor 
commits a fault as soon as he objectively acts unlawfully. It is no 
longer required that his conduct was imputable to him. 
French law only assesses the existence of fault based on a 
breach of the legal duty of reasonable care. 
B. Assessment of Fault Based on the Breach of the Duty of 
Reasonable Care 
The existence of fault is exclusively measured by reference to 
the breach of the duty to behave as a reasonable and prudent 
person placed under the same circumstances (1). This includes 
negligent actions and omissions (2).  
1. Benchmark of the Reasonable and Prudent Person Under 
the Same Circumstances 
Fault can first be established by the violation of the duty of 
reasonable care laid down by statutory provisions. It obviously 
includes conduct punished by criminal statutes passed by the 
legislature. It also encompasses behavior prohibited by other 
legislation enacted by the legislature or regulation decided by the 
executive or the administration.79 Unlike American law, these 
statutes are unconditionally admissible as references of the 
standard of reasonable care.80 There is no requirement that they 
were intended to protect the class of persons within which the 
plaintiff falls against the specific risk created by the defendant. 
Any violation of a mandatory statutory rule is also irrefutably 
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illicit, and amounts to fault. The plaintiff does not need to prove 
that the tortfeasor acted negligently, imprudently or carelessly, and 
the defendant cannot bring in contrary evidence to be excused from 
liability.81  
Furthermore, fault can result from the violation of the duty of 
reasonable care defined by case law. Like American law, French 
judges find defendants guilty of negligence when they did not act 
like a reasonable and prudent person. This ideal person is called 
the bonus pater familias or good family father, a standard inherited 
from Roman law and never rephrased despite its sexist overtone.82 
This standard of the reasonable person is an objective one. It is 
said that courts evaluate the defendant’s behavior in abstracto.83  
However, this in abstracto analysis does not prevent judges 
from referring to the conduct of the reasonable and circumspect 
person under certain similar circumstances to determine if the 
defendant was at fault.84 External circumstances of the defendant’s 
conduct are taken into account to assess his fault. Thus, the 
defendant’s behavior is compared with that of a person who does 
the same activity as the defendant and is placed in the same 
circumstances of time and place. The professional character of the 
activity falls into this category.85  
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Courts also account for certain internal circumstances. This is 
the case for the physical characteristics of the defendant. For 
instance, judges will assess the fault of a child or a disabled person 
by comparison with a child of the same age or with a person who is 
affected by the same disability.86 However, the psychological traits 
(intelligence, qualities, mental deficiencies, etc.), and cultural and 
social characteristics (level of education, background, etc.) do not 
necessarily matter to establish the standard of the reasonable 
person.87  
2. Inclusion of Negligent Actions and Omissions  
Contrary to American law, the breach of the duty of reasonable 
care can result, as a general rule, either from an act or from an 
omission to act. One of the most famous instances where the law 
creates a duty to take action lies in Criminal Code article 223-6. 
This provision imposes a duty to act upon anyone who is able “to 
prevent by immediate action a felony or a misdemeanor against the 
bodily integrity of a person” or “to offer assistance to a person in 
danger . . . without risk to himself or to third parties.” Therefore, 
the defendant who fails to prevent the perpetration of a crime on 
the victim or save him from a dangerous emergency, without risk 
to himself or a third party, commits a fault. As a result, the 
defendant is accountable to the victim for the damage that the 
crime or the emergency caused him.88  
In conclusion, French tort law appears general as it always 
binds the defendant to only one standard of care, the harsh standard 
of reasonable care, to establish his liability. Nonetheless, it can be 
doubted that there are no limitations on the tortfeasor’s liability, 
which therefore proves to be relative. 
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IV. FRANCE’S IMPLIED LIMITATIONS ON THE SCOPE OF THE 
DEFENDANT’S LIABILITY FOR FAULT 
France does recognize that the scope of the defendant’s tort 
liability can be sometimes limited based on the enforcement of 
different public policies, and accordingly appear relative. In this 
case, he no longer owes the general duty of reasonable care. 
Instead, he is under a lighter duty or does not owe any duties at all.  
However, unlike American law, these limitations are not 
clearly expressed in the law. They result from the application of 
various legal mechanisms that are involved in establishing the 
defendant’s civil responsibility. Therefore, it is necessary to 
identify all of these diverse means that cordon off the actor’s 
liability. First, the defendant can limit his duty of reasonable care 
by invoking the defense of force majeure (A). Then, causation is 
used to restrict the scope of tortfeasors’ liability (B). Finally, the 
law itself sometimes implicitly imposes a limited duty on some 
defendants (C).  
A. Limitations of the Duty of Care Based on the Implementation of 
the Force Majeure Defense 
In French tort law, force majeure is a defense used by 
defendants who would otherwise be liable for the damage caused 
to their victims. It consists of an unpredictable, superseding event 
that makes the defendant unable to foresee and avoid the risk and 
damage that his behavior actually causes to the victim.89 It can take 
three forms. First, it can be a natural event (earthquake, storm, 
lightening) or third parties’ collective conduct (war). In addition, 
the victim’s conduct can constitute such an intervening cause. 
Third, the intervening event may correspond to a third party’s 
individual conduct (such as the perpetration of a crime).90 
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The traditional approach91 considered that force majeure 
actually exonerated an actor from liability only if it was extraneous 
(foreign) to the defendant, unforeseeable, and unavoidable.92 
Modern case law and doctrine only require that the tortfeasor did 
not provoke the event,93 and the intervening cause was 
unavoidable to immunize him from liability. They especially no 
longer demand that force majeure be unforeseeable. Indeed, an 
unforeseeable event is allegedly unavoidable by nature, because no 
one can prevent something unpredictable from happening. 
Accordingly, force majeure’s unforseeability element is considered 
as being encompassed in the unavoidability aspect which only 
determines the existence of force majeure.94 
However, whether unavoidable based on its unforeseeability or 
by itself, force majeure appears to play out as a limitation on the 
scope of the defendant’s duty of reasonable care according to 
different public policies. On the one hand, when it is deemed 
unavoidable based on its unforeseeability, it circumscribes the 
defendant’s responsibility to the only risks that he could 
reasonably anticipate (1). On the other hand, when an unavoidable 
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event qualifies in itself as force majeure, it releases the tortfeasor 
from his duty to act reasonably based on the application of other 
public policies (2).  
1. Circumscribing of the Defendant’s Responsibility to the 
Foreseeable Risks 
The general rule will be given (a) and an example will be 
provided (b). 
a. General Rule 
French law recognition of unavoidable force majeure based on 
its unforeseeability actually causes to limit the scope of the 
defendant’s duty of care to the only reasonably foreseeable risks. 
Therefore, he is bound to a lighter duty of care and no longer owes 
a duty of reasonable care.  
Classic French doctrine contends that the liability relief created 
by unavoidable force majeure as a result of its unforeseeability 
does not constitute an independent limitation on the scope of the 
liability of the defendant who is still under a duty of reasonable 
care. It argues that the restrictions established by this form of force 
majeure rather result from the mere implementation of the 
elements of the prima facie case for one’s liability for fault, i.e., 
causation and fault. Thus, on one hand, the existence of 
unavoidable force majeure due to its unforeseeability allegedly 
overcomes the defendant’s fault in the causal chain. It is only 
because a subsequent event later intervened and unexpectedly 
modified the chain of causation leading to the victim’s injury that 
the tortfeasor’s conduct “created” this damage. Therefore, the force 
majeure event is the only cause of the victim’s damage, and the 
actor’s conduct is not.95 On the other hand, the actor is regarded as 
not at fault. Indeed, a reasonable and prudent person under the 
same (external) circumstances would not have foreseen the risk 
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created by unavoidable force majeure based on its unforeseeability, 
provided that the foreseeability of its occurrence is assessed under 
the same reasonable person standard.96 Therefore, it was 
reasonable for the defendant to behave as he did (i.e., injuring the 
plaintiff), and he committed no fault. 97  
However, it is untrue to assert that the occurrence of 
unavoidable force majeure based on its unforeseeability terminates 
the causal relationship between the actor’s defective conduct and 
the injury in question. According to the equivalence of conditions 
(cause in fact) theory, there is causation: the victim would not have 
been injured but for the defendant’s fault.98 Therefore, the liability 
relief created by this kind of force majeure is not based on the 
mere implementation of the causation element within the 
framework of the establishment of one’s liability for fault.  
Likewise, the existence of unavoidable force majeure as a 
result of its unforeseeability does not necessarily excuse an actor 
from liability by taking away his fault. He may still have behaved 
unreasonably in this case by failing to prevent damage in general 
from occurring to the victim. Therefore, if he is excused from 
liability based on the occurrence of unforeseeable force majeure 
proving unavoidable, it is rather because he is only bound to a 
limited duty to prevent the specific damage that he could 
reasonably foresee in order to be held liable for it. 99 A slip-and-fall 
case illustrates this. 
b. Instance of Publicly-Owned Common Carriers’ Restricted 
Duty of Care to Passengers as to the Land Condition 
The Cour de Cassation’s ruling of October 9, 1969 shows that 
the characterization of unavoidable force majeure based on its 
unforeseeability actually leads to limiting the scope of a 
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defendant’s duty of care to the only reasonably foreseeable 
risks.100 Here, a passenger of the Paris subway system slipped and 
fell on a banana peel that was on the floor in the hallway and sued 
the state-owned subway company. It must be specified that at that 
time courts bound common carriers to a warranty to ensure their 
passengers’ safety while carrying them (even between 
connections) and held them liable for a breach thereof,101 which 
was actually similar to tort law.102  
In its ruling, the higher court considered that the metro station 
had been swept according to the safety instructions provided by the 
regulatory authority. As a result, it held that the banana peel 
incident constituted unavoidable force majeure due to its 
unforeseeability and released the subway entity from 
responsibility. Nevertheless, if the subway company failed to 
behave reasonably in sweeping the station to prevent damage in 
general from occurring to the victim, it should still have been liable 
to him for his slip-and-fall. Therefore, this actually limits the duty 
of the subway entity to prevent only the specific damage that it 
could reasonably foresee as to its premises such as required by the 
cleaning regulations, especially when it is a state-owned entity.103 
On the other hand, when force majeure corresponds to an 
irresistible event by itself, it limits the scope of the defendant’s 
responsibility based on other public policies. 
2. Limits on the Defendant’s Duty of Care Based on Other 
Public Policies 
The principle will be laid out (a), followed by a case to 
illuminate it (b). 
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The existence of unavoidable force majeure in itself, which 
excuses the defendant from liability, creates a specific limit on the 
scope of his duty of reasonable care based on different public 
policies. This is what the analysis of French case law shows 
despite the opposite assertion of the classical doctrine. To classical 
French scholars, unavoidable force majeure in itself immunizes the 
defendant because it takes away his fault. Indeed, the actor usually 
takes all the necessary precautions to prevent the damage from 
happening. He acts like a reasonable and prudent person under the 
same (external) circumstances. It is only because there is an 
extraneous damaging event which is bound to happen that he 
causes the victim harm. Therefore, the defendant cannot be 
considered to have committed any fault nor held liable to the 
victim.104  
However, it may occur that the defendant is still at fault in this 
type of case. He may prove to have behaved unreasonably by 
failing to prevent damage in general from occurring to the victim. 
Therefore, if he is relieved from liability as a result of the 
occurrence of unavoidable force majeure in itself, it is actually on 
the basis that he only owes a limited duty to prevent specific 
damage based on the enforcement of public policies in order to be 
held liable for it. A case about landowners’ premises liability to 
third parties shows that.  
b. Example of Landowners’ Limited Liability to Third Parties 
off of their Premises 
The Cour de cassation’s decision of January 6, 1982 
demonstrates that landowners are bound under French law to a 
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lighter duty than the standard of reasonable care when the natural 
or altered conditions of their premises create risks for people 
outside their property.105 Here, a landowner had erected an 
embankment with various materials on his property. Later, a strong 
thunderstorm came. Because of the rain, a brook was turned into a 
violent torrent which washed away the materials. These objects 
eventually ended up blocking a dam, which caused the waterway 
to flood a near warehouse and damage all of the merchandise 
stored in it. The owner of the warehouse sued the landowner for 
his negligence in not securing the materials when knowing a severe 
storm was coming.  
Referring to Civil Code Article 1382, the French Supreme 
Court held that the storm was an irresistible event that qualified as 
force majeure and released the landowner from liability for the 
damage caused to this third party as a result of the condition of his 
premises. However, the landowner may still have acted 
unreasonably in not preventing damage in general as a result of the 
failure to properly secure the equipment stored on his property in 
this hilly area of France where violent storms are frequent. 
Accordingly, the liability relief applied here means that the 
landowner is only bound to a lighter duty than the duty of 
reasonable care as to the specific damage that the condition of his 
premises may cause to third parties. 
The French conception of the land possessor’s liability can be 
compared to the American approach, which also applies a limited 
duty rule. The traditional rule is that the landowner does not owe 
the persons off the premises a duty to protect them against the risks 
created by the natural condition of the premises.106 If the possessor 
or anyone else has altered the natural condition of the land so as to 
create or aggravate the risks, the possessor may be bound to a light 
duty of care.107 The California case Keys v. Romley illustrates this 
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view.108 Romley (through his lessee) built an ice rink on his 
property and paved around the building with asphalt. Around the 
same time, the Keys also improved their premises by building a 
store on it. They placed the dirt that they excavated at the rear of 
the property, which was adjacent to Romley’s parcel. Later, they 
decided to remove the dirt and the rain run-off started to flow from 
Romley’s property onto their land, which was located at a lower 
level. The construction of the rink and the paving on Romley’s 
premises was found to be the cause of the flooding.  
The Supreme Court of California held that the higher-ground 
owner who changed the natural system of drainage could be liable 
to the lower-ground owner according to the servitude of natural 
drainage. However, this was the case only if he did not take the 
reasonable precautions to avoid flooding the adjacent property, and 
the lower-ground owner did not reasonably undertake to remedy 
the nuisance.109 Thus, the higher-ground landowner is bound to a 
light duty of care. He is no longer required to behave reasonably to 
prevent probable risk in general from occurring. It is only if he 
acted unreasonably and the defendant reasonably tried to solve the 
problem that he is liable. In this case, the higher court held that this 
rule was in the support of the public policy of improving the land 
and remanded the case to the lower court to determine whether 
Romley’s liability arises from the flow path depending on the 
reasonableness of the removal of the dirt pile by the Keys.110 
Judges also use causation as a method for limiting the scope of 
the defendant’s liability. 
B. Application of the Adequacy Theory to Limit Tortfeasors’ 
Responsibility 
French judges may limit the defendant’s duty of care by setting 
aside the equivalence of conditions theory (or cause in fact theory) 
                                                                                                             
 108. Keys v. Romley, 64 Cal. 2d 396 (1966). 
 109. Id. at 409. 
 110. Id. at 411. 




and applying other causation standards, such as the adequacy 
theory. This mostly involves cases where several events combine 
to cause the plaintiff’s indivisible injury.111 According to the 
equivalence of conditions theory, each event that is a necessary 
antecedent of the occurrence of the accident should be recognized 
as the cause of the damage and lead to the perpetrator’s liability.112 
However, under the adequacy theory, courts will qualify as 
“cause” only those events which, in reference to the scientific 
knowledge at the time they occur, can normally and foreseeably 
create the harm.113 In doing so, courts actually intend to balance 
the equity and limit certain clumsy actors’ duty in order to better 
punish more delinquent tortfeasors. This especially occurs when 
defendants commit greatly uneven faults (1) or cause subsequent 
damage remote in time (2).  
1. Exoneration of Slight Faults in Presence of a Grave Fault 
Judges use causation to limit the duty of care of actors whose 
slight faults combine with a more serious one to bring about the 
victim’s damage. They consider that, under the adequacy theory, 
the gravest fault constitutes the only cause of the injury and 
excuses all the perpetrators of the slight faults from liability.114 
Nevertheless, all those faults caused in fact the harm and should 
lead to the defendants’ liability. Therefore, this means that France 
implements relative tort liability and slightly faulty defendants 
have no duty of care in the presence of a tortfeasor committing a 
grave fault.  
The classical example of an accident caused by a stolen car 
illustrates this idea. In a March 4, 1981 case, Mrs. X left her car 
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with the doors unlocked and the key in the ignition in front of her 
nephew’s house at night.115 Later, the nephew and his delinquent 
friends stole the car and collided with another car. The driver of 
the other vehicle sued the aunt for negligence. The Cour de 
Cassation ruled that only the nephew’s grave negligent driving 
was the cause of the collision. Mrs. X’s alleged negligence did not 
constitute the cause of the accident. As a result, it dismissed the 
claim against the aunt for negligence.  
Here, it is of note that negligence on the part of the car owner 
applies. She unreasonably left her car on a city street, unlocked, 
with the keys in the ignition, thereby opening the way for a thief to 
steal it and have a car accident with it. Therefore, cause in fact was 
established as the thief would not have stolen the car and caused an 
accident but for the owner’s negligence in leaving it unlocked.116 
Thus, when French Justices consider that the owner’s 
negligence in leaving his car unlocked with the keys in the ignition 
may never be the cause of the car accident between the thief and 
the victim, they actually limit his duty of care. According to the 
equivalence of conditions theory, there is causation. If car owners 
are not liable in fact, it is rather because their duty does not extend 
to third parties’ criminal conduct. 
Defendant’s liability is also excluded for subsequent damage 
too remote in time.  
2. Liability Exclusion for Subsequent Damage too Remote in 
Time 
When a prior accident concurred with a second event to bring 
about new damage, case law often uses the adequacy theory to 
decide that only the second incident caused the new injury. The 
previous accident remote in time is left out of the causal chain, 
though it was a necessary antecedent according to the equivalence 
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of conditions theory. This aims to limit the scope of tortfeasors’ 
liability by releasing them from indefinite responsibility for the 
subsequent damage brought about by their original negligence. 
A Cour de Cassation ruling of February 8, 1989 emphasizes 
this point.117 Mr. Y became physically disabled after a car accident 
with Mr. X, who was entirely liable. Mr. Y had to be continuously 
assisted in moving around. Ten years after the car collision, the 
bed on which the victim was laying caught on fire, and Mr. Y, who 
could not move out of his bed, died in the fire. The widow brought 
a wrongful death and survival action against the negligent driver 
and his insurance company to recover damages.  
The Court of Cassation decided that only the event nearer in 
time, that is, the fire, was the cause of the disabled man’s death. It 
rejected the argument that the prior car accident which occurred 10 
years earlier also concurred to bring about Mr. Y’s death. Indeed, 
after the crash, Mr. X and his insurer had paid Mr. Y damages for 
getting help to especially prevent this kind of disaster from 
happening. Therefore, the Court excused the negligent driver and 
his insurance firm from liability.  
However, according to the equivalence of conditions theory, 
the prior accident is the cause of the subsequent damage, since the 
latter would not have occurred without the former. In real life, this 
case demonstrates that judges do not intend to extend the scope of 
initial tortfeasors’ liability to too remote subsequent damage 
resulting from their original negligence. Otherwise, anyone would 
be endlessly liable for his negligence. 
Finally, French law may itself impose specific limited duty on 
some tortfeasors to limit the scope of their liability.  
C. Acknowledgement of Defendants’ Specific Limited Duties  
In some instances, defendants may bear a limited duty of care. 
This is the case for employees’ implied limited liability for damage 
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to third parties arising out of the performance of their job (1) and 
some parties’ limited warranty liability (2).  
1. Employees’ Implied Limited Liability for Damage Arising 
out of the Performance of Their Job Tasks 
Under French law, the general rule is that employees are 
subject to limited liability as to the damage they cause to third 
parties during the performance of their job tasks. In the meantime, 
it must be emphasized that French employers bear vicarious 
liability for the torts of their employees when there is an 
employment relationship and the latter were acting within the 
scope of their employment, as do American employers.118 First, an 
employment relationship exists when the employer has the right to 
exercise some degree of direction and control over his 
employee,119 such as in an employment contract ((whereby the 
employer determines the physical details (time, place, method, 
etc.) of the performance of the work and fires his employees))120 
but not in an independent agency contract.121 An employee is then 
considered acting within the scope of his employment when he 
performs his job tasks (or at least was within the place and time of 
work or used the company’s tools or other means when the 
accident occurred) or follows his employer’s instructions or 
attempts to act for the benefit of the company.122 
It was the French Supreme Court’s case of February 25, 2000 
which first decided in favor of French employees’ limited liability 
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for damage arising out of the performance of their job tasks.123 
Here, a pilot of a helicopter spread pesticide over a field during a 
windy day, in accordance with his job tasks. The wind caused the 
chemicals to reach adjacent fields. Based on former French case 
law holding that an employee was jointly and severally liable with 
his employer for his negligence falling within the scope of his 
employment, the owners of these lands sued the pilot and his 
employer, the helicopter company, for the damage to their 
property. Nevertheless, the Higher Court considered that the pilot’s 
negligence (spreading the pesticides during a windy day) arose 
from the performance of his job tasks which his employer had 
entrusted to him and therefore excused him from liability. Only his 
employer was to be found liable. Thus, this means that employees, 
acting within the scope of their employment, have an implied 
limited duty that excludes liability for the damage caused to 
victims while performing a specific task which their employer 
entrusted to them at the time of the accident. 
In summary, when an employee follows his superior’s order 
which falls within with his lawful job description, he is immune 
from liability, and only his employer is vicariously liable for his 
negligence under the respondeat superior doctrine.124 However, 
when he violates his lawful job description at his employer’s 
request and commits negligence or intentional torts (that can also 
be criminal offences), he is liable for the damage to the victim, as 
is his employer, under vicarious liability. Finally, when he 
disobeys his superiors’ instruction or pursues his own interest with 
no advantage to the company, he is liable alone (employer’s 
vicarious liability does not apply here).125 
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2. Parties’ Limited Warranty Liability 
When a party performs his contract requiring the achievement 
of work or services, he may be bound to a limited warranty lighter 
than the warranty of workmanlike performance (which is similar to 
U.S. tort law). As a result, he bears limited liability for the bodily 
injury and property damage caused to the opposing party while 
performing the contract.126 
For instance, in a bailment, unless there is monetary 
consideration or the bailee benefits from it, the bailee is bound to a 
warranty to care as much for the property in his possession as he 
does for his own property.127 As a result, if he is used to caring for 
his belongings worse than a reasonable person does, he will be 
bound to a limited warranty causing him to have lighter liability 
for the property damage to the bailor. 
In conclusion, French tort law appears to be based on a 
misunderstanding. On the one hand, it states that it applies general 
fault-based tort liability, and everyone is bound to the duty of 
reasonable care. On the other hand, it diverts the different elements 
of the prima facie case for people’s liability for fault to limit the 
scope of their duty of reasonable care and implements relative tort 
liability. Therefore, it would be better to publicly recognize that 
there is no longer a general principle of liability for fault and the 
scope of one’s fault-based liability may be limited for public policy 
considerations.  
V. A NEW APPROACH IN FRENCH LAW: THE INTRODUCTION OF THE 
(LIMITED) DUTY REQUIREMENT INTO FAULT-BASED TORT 
LIABILITY 
The official acknowledgement of the existence of limitations 
on the scope of the defendant’s duty would definitively cause 
French tort law to switch from a system based on general fault-
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based tort liability to a system that applies relative responsibility. 
France could continue to implement a single liability clause 
providing for the liability of those who intentionally or negligently 
breach the duty of care. However, tortfeasors would not always be 
bound to the duty of reasonable care. They could owe a lighter 
duty or no duty at all. It would be up to victims to prove the 
existence of duties of care on the part of defendants to hold them 
liable.128 According to the French traditional principle of separate 
power, the legislature should determine the various public policies 
driving the duties of care, and the judiciary should only implement 
them.  
This relative liability approach would present two main 
advantages. First, it would improve the organization of the law 
(A). Second, French tort law would become more consistent with 
the Principles of European Tort Law129 and other European 
countries’ tort law to improve economic efficiency in the European 
Union (B).  
A. Improved Organization of the Law 
The adoption of the concept of relative tortious liability leads 
to better foreseeability of the law (1) and helps draw the line 
between liability for fault and other liabilities (2). 
1. Better Foreseeability of the Law 
One of the advantages of circumscribing the scope of 
individuals’ duty is to establish clear and abstract categories of 
negligence liability situations according to public policies and a 
hierarchy between the various protected rights. Everyone would 
know when he is liable to certain classes of people for specific 
types of risks, and when he is not. Thus, individuals can predict the 
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outcome of their behavior, and in some cases, adjust it in order to 
be immunized from liability. This foreseeability enhances the 
economic efficiency of society.130 
For instance, it could be highlighted that economically weaker 
victims are usually protected by the law. This is illustrated by 
employees’ liability exclusion for damage caused during the 
performance of the specific task which their employers entrusted to 
them within their job descriptions.131 Here, employees are subject 
to indemnification claims by their employers who compensate 
victims under the respondeat superior doctrine. However, these 
employees did not profit from their wrongdoing and are not usually 
insured for it, unlike their superiors. Therefore, they are the 
economically weakest parties and are immunized from liability.  
At the same time, it could be pointed out that French law 
promotes economic efficiency. For instance, courts allow business 
entities to operate at a lower cost to ensure the provision of 
valuable public services by freeing them from certain 
unforeseeable liability, such as shown in frivolous slip-and-fall 
cases.132 In addition, a landowner can reasonably improve his land 
to conduct affairs without risking unjustified lawsuits.133 Lastly, 
the law sets limits on people’s liability for subsequent damage 
resulting from their original negligence. It does not want them to 
be infinitely liable for their conduct and dissuade all economic 
ventures.134  
2. Drawing the Line between Fault-Based Tort Liability and 
Other Liabilities 
First, the adoption of the relative liability rule could allow 
French law to better distinguish between fault-based tort liability 
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and strict liability.135 As a general rule, according to the Latin 
adage specialia generalibus derogant, judges must exclusively rely 
on the specific law of strict liability when they decide a case which 
falls within the framework of this regime. They cannot apply fault-
based liability in its stead. It said that liability without fault 
excludes civil responsibility for fault. In other words, if the 
plaintiff does not meet the requirements to hold the defendant 
strictly liable, he cannot then invoke his fault as a second shot at 
the defendant. He is barred from recovery. Liability for fault only 
applies when there are no other specific regimes which preempt 
it.136 However, in practice, judges loosely follow this rule and 
often turn to fault-based liability when strict liability cannot be 
established.137 The remedy for this problem could be that courts 
neutralize the defendant’s duty of care in civil responsibility for 
fault (which therefore would no longer apply) when strict liability 
applies. Thus, judges would be bound to apply only strict liability 
when they decide a case which falls within the boundaries of this 
regime. It would be impossible for them to resort to liability for 
fault in this situation.138 
Second, it could be argued that the defendant’s limited duty of 
care under one’s liability for fault is restricted if he fails to act 
reasonably while performing a contract. As a result, his liability 
would only be dealt with under warranty breach, so that he can be 
able to provide for contractual liability limits.139 
The adoption of the scope of duty approach in French law 
would make it closer to the Principles of European Tort Law which 
intend to harmonize the European Union countries’ tort law.  
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B. Harmonization with the Principles of European Tort Law 
The public acknowledgement in France of the existence of 
limitations on the scope of defendants’ duty within the framework 
of its single liability clause would line French law up with the 
Principles of European Tort Law.140 Indeed, this European tort law 
project141 adopts the single liability clause providing for the civil 
liability of all those who cause damage by intentionally or non-
intentionally breaching the duty of care (called fault).142 It also 
recognizes that the scope of defendants’ liability may be limited 
based on the enforcement of public policy considerations. They 
may not always be bound to a duty of reasonable care—it can be a 
lighter one. As a result, the Principles of European Tort Law 
implement the principle of relative tort liability. It is set forth in 
chapter 3, section 2, article 3:201, which reads: 
Art. 3:201. Scope of Liability 
Where an activity is a cause within the meaning of Section 
1 of this Chapter [cause-in-fact], whether and to what 
extent damage may be attributed to a person depends on 
factors such as: 
a) the foreseeablity of the damage to a reasonable person at 
the time of the activity, taking into account in particular the 
closeness in time and space between the damaging activity 
and its consequences, or the magnitude of the damage in 
relation to the normal consequences of such an activity; 
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b) the nature and the value of the protected interests (article 
2:102); 
c) the basis of liability (article 1:101); 
d) the extent of the ordinary risks of life; and 
e) the protective purpose of the rule that has been 
violated.143  
Further, this would not cause an important change in French 
law. Indeed, when France diverts the different elements of 
defendants’ liability for fault to limit the scope of their 
responsibility, it does so based on the enforcement of the same 
public policies as in the Principles. Thus, the scope of the 
defendant’s duty can be limited to the foreseeable risks in both 
systems.144 Conversely, tortfeasors are bound to a full duty of 
reasonable care when they cause death or severe bodily injury. 
Finally, the adoption of the limited liability rule in France seems to 
be highly advantageous to further integration with the other EU 
countries. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The general principle of liability for fault as applied by France 
proves insufficient to organize people’s liability for their 
misconduct and allocate the loss caused by each other. Modern 
societies have to carry on the rule of relative responsibility and 
limit the scope of individuals’ duty of reasonable care in certain 
situations. This leads to more efficient apportionment of harm 
between the different actors. Depending on public policies, France 
jurisprudence itself already limits the scope of such a duty of care 
by diverting the elements of one’s liability for fault. This 
demonstrates that French law should go further in this direction, 
and French doctrine should openly recognize the existence of 
limited duties of care under the single clause governing fault-based 
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tort liability in order to be harmonized with its European 
neighbors’ tort law.  
